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Chinese Intellectuals and the Problem of Xinjiang, Part 2
March 18, 2009 in In Case You Missed It by The China Beat | No comments

Wang Lixiong and progressive democracy
This essay continues the discussion of Wang Lixiong’s work begun in Part I, which ran at China
Beat on March 9, 2009.
By Sebastian Veg
Having analyzed the issues of colonialism, cultural rights of Uyghur populations, and the question of a
Han nationalist revival, Wang Lixiong concludes the book by three “letters” to his Uyghur friend
Mokhtar, in which he reframes the discussion on Xinjiang within his more general ideas on political
reform in China. His reluctance to consider Xinjiang as “different” from other regions in China (while
he is less reluctant to do so in the case of Tibet) is not unproblematic; nonetheless his voice is
important because he is a critical intellectual “on the edge” who has visibly not entirely renounced
influencing the debate in Beijing policy circles.
Wang Lixiong has some deep-set doubts, both about the practicality of independence as a goal for
Xinjiang (due to the presence of a large Han population and their control of resources), and about
what he calls “large-scale democracy”. In another text, he expresses his agreement with a draft
Constitution prepared by a group of dissidents (Yan Jiaqi and others), under which Tibet would receive
a high degree of autonomy and the possibility to determine its own status after 25 years, while
Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia would only be granted the status of autonomy through a two-thirds vote
in the National People’s Congress.
While Wang insists that he doesn’t mind one way or the other whether Xinjiang becomes independent,
he emphasises alternatives to independence: the guarantee of genuine religious freedom, and the
possibility of controlling labour migration by a work permit system that would apply to “cultural
protection zones” (including Tibet), and which would serve to prevent desertification, degradation of
the environment, and growing water shortages (p. 439). For Wang, democratisation in China, as
opposed to a higher degree of autonomy, might be prone to nationalist manipulation and internal
fracturing. He therefore calls for an embrace of the Dalai Lama’s “Middle Way” of a high degree of
autonomy within the framework of a federal China, going so far as to propose that the Dalai Lama
become the chairman of a provisional government.
Nonetheless, his three “letters to Mokhtar” reveal some of the contradictions underpinning his
thoughts on political reform in China. The first letter, devoted to terrorism, is very much in the
apocalyptic mode of his science-fiction novel Yellow Peril. In his second letter, he insists on Chinese
nationalism. For Wang, China did not experience the nation-state model before 1911, and at that time
its first formulation included Xinjiang and Tibet in Sun Yat-sen’s “Republic of five races” (Han,
Man/Manchu, Meng/Mongolian, Hui/Muslim, Zang/Tibetan). He adds that nationalism has always been
an essential part of CCP ideology, and now the only portion remaining. For these two reasons he
believes that democratisation would not necessarily solve the nationality question (p. 444).
Whereas the Soviet constitution, no matter how misused, originally foresaw regional autonomy on
paper by virtue of its federal nature, Wang asserts that no similar provision exists in the PRC
Constitution, and that as a result, if China began unravelling, there would be no framework to stop the
process from spreading to Guangdong or Shanghai. Conversely, he worries about an independent
Xinjiang continuing to break down along ethnic lines into myriad autonomous micro-states, underlining
that Uyghurs represent a majority of the population in only about one third of the territory
concentrated in Southern Xinjiang, where there is no oil and resources. He wonders about the rights of
the Hui (although one could easily object that there are Dungan populations in most of Central Asia),
and highlights that Tibet, by contrast, is practically a mono-ethnic area. This is somewhat troubling, as
in his articles on Tibet Wang argues against the viability of Tibetan independence, despite its ethnic
homogeneity, on the grounds that the small Han elite controls the most productive sectors of the
economy and the most dynamic groups in Tibetan society (“Zhuceng dijin zhi”, art. cit.).

Wang’s assertion about the lack of a legal framework is not quite true: China’s Law on Regional Ethnic
Autonomy (Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minzu quyu zizhifa), revised in 2001 and largely
disseminated though a 2003 State Council White Paper on the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
(XUAR), could provide a legal framework for autonomy (though not for secession, like the Soviet
constitution), even though it clearly remains a political fiction at the present time (as was the Soviet
constitution). More largely, within the context of the international conventions ratified even by the
present Chinese government, as well as other international declarations, a stable body of norms
regarding minority rights and rights for indigenous populations would be available to guarantee either
substantial autonomy for Uyghurs within China, or for Han within an independent Xinjiang. In this
respect, Wang Lixiong seems to remain captive to conventional views in China that describe
international covenants as instruments of power play: he describes them as merely a pretext for
American or Western intervention in Xinjiang aimed at destabilising China, and quotes the theory of
“precedence of human rights over sovereignty” or renquan gaoyu zhuquan.
His third letter deals with his system of proposed “progressive democracy” (dijin minzhu) and the
implicit critique of liberal democracy it contains. Wang calls the latter “forum democracy” (guangchang
minzhu, p. 457), and believes it can only exacerbate interethnic tensions, which will be fanned by the
elite, a phenomenon not unknown in “mature democracies” (he cites support for the Iraq war).
“Large-scale democracy” (daguimo minzhu) will polarise political debate and lead straight to fascism
(p. 460), as opinion leaders in Xinjiang will want to settle scores with China, the media will pour oil on
the fire to make money, and the “masses,” who love heroes and lofty speeches, will follow populists
and opportunists.
Nonetheless, he sees democracy as the key to resolving ethnic conflicts, the problem being not
democracy itself but “large-scale democracy.” Therefore, Wang goes over old ground by proposing a
system of indirect elections, based on natural villages, in which votes would take place by household,
each household selecting one representative (one wonders how women would fare in this system of
representation), thereby allowing for direct deliberative democracy by consensus. The elected
representative automatically becomes a voter on the higher level, and so on, preserving the direct and
participatory nature of democracy (p. 464). In fact, this blueprint clearly reveals Wang Lixiong’s
misgivings about representation and vote by majority. He favours consensus over voting, pointing out
that all elections are problematic, even in the United States (the 2000 presidential election inevitably
comes up), not to mention in a Tibetan village in which a majority of inhabitants are illiterate.
Although he writes that in this system policy decisions on various levels should not interfere, he gives
no guiding principle, not even a philosophical one, to explain how responsibility should be divided. The
implicit assumption is, in fact, that voters are not qualified to deal with any matters beyond their
immediate experience, and that the only decisions taken on each level are those that directly affect
the life of the constituency. “Regarding larger matters that go beyond the borders of their immediate
experience, it is very difficult for the masses to gain a correct grasp” (p. 466). This is a highly elitist
system, the most worrying aspect of which is that it relies on the spontaneous generation of a social
elite to foster democracy, rather than on an institutionalised system of checks and balances. Although
Wang insists that this system will ensure that China does not break apart by guaranteeing both
autonomy and cohesion (p. 468), one cannot help but wonder whether China and Xinjiang would not
be better served at the outset by a full implementation of China’s own Autonomy Law, to be
completed by other guarantees of the rights of minorities as set out in international laws and norms.
Interestingly enough, while he is so wary of representative democracy, Wang Lixiong entirely trusts
his own electoral system to guarantee individual and collective rights by its intrinsic mechanisms
rather than by formalised norms (p. 469).
For these reasons, although Wang Lixiong has gone further than most Chinese intellectuals in
exploring the rights and claims of ethnic minorities and how they fit into the political problems of
China as a whole, this book remains somewhat disappointing. It is true that he paints a sympathetic
portrait of “ordinary Uyghurs,” far removed from the usual clichés of official discourse, exoticism, or
commonly repeated slurs — an important accomplishment that may act as bridge towards evenminded ordinary Han Chinese citizens. But just as he portrayed Tibetans as prone to blindly following
Maoism as a new religion during the Cultural Revolution, smashing their own temples and Buddhas,
and then blindly reviling Mao when he proved not to have been a god after his death, his view of

Uyghur intellectuals as influenced by terrorism and Islam seems excessively culturalist in relation to
modern, secular Xinjiang. His analyses of several issues appear uninformed. Leaving aside academic
research, he is weak on government policy; a close reading of Hu Jintao’s readily available 2005
speech to the State Commission on Ethnic Affairs could have yielded important insights: one of Hu’s
central tenets is that any form of increased autonomy remain subordinate to the “three inseparables.”
Nonetheless, Wang’s openness to dialogue and public discussion of his ideas, without any taboos or
prerequisites, is an important step towards weaving the concerns of Uyghurs or Tibetans into the
debate on the democratisation of China — taking into account, of course, that the present book cannot
be published on the mainland. In this capacity, as also demonstrated by his March 2008 initiative on
Tibet, Wang Lixiong is one of the closest examples of a public intellectual in China. In this context, his
writings also demonstrate that, despite what the Chinese government publicly states, there is no
consensus in China over the fact that no price is too high to ensure that the CCP remains the
dominant force in Xinjiang or Tibet. His ideas may even trickle, gradually and windingly, to the
corridors of power. Wang Lixiong opposes independence for both Xinjiang and Tibet, but his
willingness to discuss practical measures such as migration restrictions or enhanced religious freedom
also serves as a reminder that Chinese intellectuals are not necessarily Han nationalists.
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The full text of this review essay is published in China Perspectives, no. 2008/4. The author is a
researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China.
Wang Lixiong, “Zhuceng dijin zhi yu minzhu zhi: Jiejue Xizang wenti de fangfa bijiao” (A Successive
Multilevel Electoral System vs. a Representative Democratic System: Relative advantages for resolving
the Tibet Question ),http://www.boxun.com/hero/wanglx/6_1.shtml (19 September 2008).
The Autonomy Law is available on http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-07/29/content_18338.htm. See also:
Information Office of the State Council, “History and Development of Xinjiang,” May
2003,http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-06/12/content_916306.htm.
This is the object of the debate between Wang Lixiong and Tsering Shakyar. See Wang Lixiong,
“Reflections on Tibet,” art. cit., and the rebuttal: Tsering Shakyar, “Blood in the Snow,” New Left
Review, no. 15, May-June 2002. The gist of Tsering Shakyar’s argument is that Mao-worship in Tibet
was no more blind than elsewhere in China, and that traditional Tibetan society remained dynamic and
changing despite its religious characteristics. Woeser also documents the importance of the Mao-cult
among Tibetans in Shajie: Forbidden Memory: Tibet during the Cultural Revolution (Taipei, Dakuai
wenhua, 2007).
The “three inseparables” (sange libukai) are: the Han cannot be separated from minorities, the
minorities cannot be separated from the Han, and the minorities cannot be separated one from
another. See: “Hu Jintao zai Zhongyang minzu gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua” [Hu Jintao’s Speech
at the Central Nationalities Working Committee], May 27,
2005,http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/3423605.html (12 August 2008).
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